The volatility of economic activity in most G7 economies has moderated over the past 40 years. Also, despite large increases in trade and openness, G7 business cycles have not become more synchronized. After documenting these facts, we interpret G7 output data using a structural VAR that separately identifies common international shocks, the domestic effects of spillovers from foreign idiosyncratic shocks, and the effects of domestic idiosyncratic shocks. This analysis suggests that, with the exception of Japan, a significant portion of the widespread reduction in volatility is associated with a reduction in the magnitude of the common international shocks. 
Introduction
During the past two decades, most of the G7 economies have experienced a reduction in the volatility of output growth and a concomitant moderation of business cycle fluctuations. Table 1 presents standard deviations of four-quarter growth rates of per capita GDP in the G7 countries during each of the past four decades. Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the US all experienced large reductions in volatility. Over this period, international trade flows have increased substantially, financial markets in developed economies have become increasingly integrated, and continental European countries moved to a single currency. These developments raise the possibility of changes not only in the severity of international business cycles, but also in their synchronization.
There already is a large body of research on these changes, and there is agreement on many of the basic facts. As initially pointed out by Kim and Nelson (1999) and McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), there has been a substantial This paper has two specific objectives. The first is to provide a concise summary of the empirical facts about the moderation in output volatility, changes in persistence, and changes in cyclical comovements for the G7 countries. One conclusion is that the single-break model of variance reduction, which fits the US well, does not adequately describe the international patterns of moderation. In addition, we provide further evidence of the emergence of two cyclically coherent groups, the Euro-zone and English-speaking countries.
Our second objective is to provide quantitative estimates of the sources of these changes. Are they domestic or international in origin? Do they reflect Figure 1 plots the four-quarter growth rate of per capita GDP for each country. The long-term growth rate of GDP is not constant for some of these countries, especially Germany, Japan, and Italy. The focus of this paper is fluctuations at yearly through business cycle horizons, not the determinants of early postwar trend growth in Germany, Japan, and Italy. Because a low-frequency drift can introduce bias into certain statistics, such as cross-country correlations computed over long subsamples, in some of our analysis we will use detrended versions of growth rates, where we use a flexible detrending method based on a model with a stochastic drift. Let yt = 400A \n(GDPt) be the quarterly growth of GDP at an annual rate. We adopt an unobserved components specification that represents yt as the sum of two terms, a slowly evolving mean growth rate and a stationary component Implementing this detrending procedure requires a value of the ratio o^ / Smm(O), where 5^(0) is the spectral density of ut at frequency zero. When tf/Suu(0), is small, as it plausibly is here, the maximum likelihood estimator of rf/Suu (0) has the "pileup" problem of having asymptotic point mass at zero even if its true value is nonzero but small, so we estimate <J^/Suu(0) on a country-bycountry basis using the median-unbiased estimator of Stock and Watson (1998) , and use this country-specific estimate to detrend GDP growth.1 Figure 2 plots the detrended four-quarter growth rates, that is, the rolling fourquarter average of the detrended quarterly growth rates. Comparison of Figures 1 and 2 reveals that the detrending procedure eliminates the local mean of each series, but otherwise leaves the series essentially unchanged. Figure 2 also plots the G7-wide unweighted average detrended four-quarter growth rate. Evidently many of these countries have episodes of considerable comovement, or synchronization, with aggregate G7 fluctuations. Figure 3 plots the band-pass-filtered logarithm of GDP along with the average of the BP-filtered G7 GDP.2 Evidently BP-filtered GDP, like four-quarter growth, has periods of considerable international synchronization in business cycles. Notably, at the level of detail of Figures 2 and 3, the period of greatest synchronization appears to be the 1970s, and there is no readily apparent trend towards increased synchronization.
Changes in Volatility and Persistence
This section presents statistics summarizing changes in the volatility of GDP and in the persistence of innovations to GDP in the G7 countries.
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Journal of the European Economic Association 3.1. Volatility As discussed in the introduction, there has been a substantial moderation in the volatility of economic activity over the past 40 years. To get more detail on this moderation, we estimate the time path of the instantaneous variance of GDP using a non-Gaussian smoother based on a stochastic volatility model with heavy tails and time-varying autoregressive coefficients. Let yt be the quarterly GDP growth at an annual rate. The stochastic volatility model is Formal tests for breaks in the conditional mean (that is, the autoregressive lag coefficients) and the conditional variance (that is, the autoregressive innovation variance) of GDP growth are reported in Table 2 .4 The hypothesis of constant parameters is tested using the Wald version of the Quandt likelihood ratio (QLR) statistic, evaluated over the central 70% of the sample; the test of a constant conditional variance allows for the possibility of a break in the conditional mean at an unknown date that differs from the break date for the conditional variance. The break date and its 67% confidence interval are reported if the QLR statistic 3. Nearly identical patterns emerge when the model (2) is used to estimate the instantaneous variance of bandpass-filtered GDP instead of four-quarter GDP growth (results for BP-filtered GDP are not presented to save space). 4. Raw (i.e., not detrended) GDP growth rates are used in Table 2 to coincide more closely to the distribution theory underlying these statistics (Andrews 1991 and Bai 1997) . Figure 4 look more like a series of plateaus than a linear trend. Taken together, we interpret all this as evidence that the pattern of the change in GDP volatility for most G7 countries is more complex than the single-break model that describes the US.
Persistence and Size of Univariate Shocks
Another way to look at the changing autocovariances of GDP growth in these countries is to examine changes in the variance of the AR innovation and in the sum of the AR coefficients, which measures the persistence of a shock to GDP growth. Changes in the variance of GDP growth imply that its spectrum has changed; an increase in the sum of the AR coefficients implies an increase in the relative mass at frequency zero, while a change in the innovation variance implies a shift in the level (but not necessarily the shape) of the spectrum. We use two methods to capture time variation in the AR. The first method allows for a discrete break in 1984. Although a break in 1984 describes the U.S. data well, variation in the other countries is more subtle, so this single-break approach is best thought of as simply providing results for the first and second halves of the sample. The second method uses AR models estimated over rolling samples. The rolling regression estimated at date t is estimated by weighted least squares using two-sided exponential weighting, where the observation at date s received a weight of S^~s\ where we used a value of 8 = 0.97.5 Both the splitsample and rolling AR models use four lags and are estimated using the detrended GDP growth rates from (1). Table 3 shows the sum of the coefficients and the one-step-ahead forecast standard error for the split-sample AR models. The sum measures the persistence of an innovation to GDP, and by this measure GDP innovations have become substantially more persistent for Canada, France, and the UK. Persistence has increased slightly for the US and Italy, while it has declined for Germany and Japan. For all countries except Japan, the magnitude of the GDP innovations, as measured by the standard error of the regression, has decreased substantially: onequarter-ahead forecasts based on univariate autoregressions have become more accurate for the G7 countries. Figure 5 summarizes the results for the rolling AR models. Panel (a) presents estimated time paths for the sum of coefficients and panel (b) plots the estimated innovation standard deviation. These plots are consistent with the two-sample evidence in Table 3 . In all countries, the innovation variance fell substantially, 5. Similar results are obtained using the non-Gaussian smoother estimates based on (2), and for values of 8 ranging from 0.95 to 0.98. The two-sided exponential weighting scheme is used here for comparability with the two-sided VAR estimates reported in Sections 4 and 6.
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Journal of the European Economic Association Notes: These results are based on AR(4) models (excluding a constant) estimated using the detrended growth rates described in Section 2.
although it increased again during the 1990s in Japan. In Canada, France, and the UK, persistence has increased substantially, while persistence has been roughly constant for the US. The timing of these changes differs across countries, a result consistent with the different patterns of declining variances in Figure 4 . 
Changes in Synchronization
This section reports various measures of time-varying international comovements of GDP. To facilitate comparisons with the analysis of Sections 5 and 6 using the FS VAR, these measures are estimated using a reduced form seven-country VAR. The section begins by describing the reduced form VAR, then turns to the measures of time-vary ing correlations. Norrbin and Schlagenhauf (1996) . Results from that VAR are reported as part of the sensitivity analysis in Section 6.
The second moments of interest in this paper can all be computed directly from estimates of the VAR parameters in ( break date as having been chosen to maximize the value of the test statistic in that particular cell. To the extent that the break date was selected by examining the data, the first set of p -values overstate the statistical evidence of parameter instability, but because there is a single break date, not one selected to maximize any individual cell entry, the 77-values in brackets are conservative and understate the evidence of parameter instability. In fact, we chose the 1984 break date based on the large body of evidence for the US so, for countries other than the US, the fixed-date /7-values arguably are a better approximation than the conservative /7-values in brackets. In any event, qualitatively similar conclusions are reached using both sets of /7-values. There is evidence of changes in the VAR variances for Canada, Germany, Italy, the UK, and the US (the results for France depends on which /7-value is used). There is also evidence of coefficient instability in the equations for Canada, France, and the UK. The hypothesis that all the VAR parameters are the same in the two subsamples is rejected at the 1% significance level using both the fixed break date and conservative critical values. The changes in the VAR coefficients are difficult to interpret directly, so instead we turn to the implications of these changes for international output growth correlations. Table 5 Table 5 (a), during the first subsample the average correlation within the two groups was 0.50 (continental Europe) and 0.50 (English-speaking), and the average crossgroup correlation was 0.38. In the second period the average correlations within the two groups rise to 0.65 (continental Europe) and 0.70 (English-speaking), while the average cross-group correlation drops to 0.28. Thus the average withingroup correlation rose by 0.18 and the average cross-group correlation fell by 0.10. This contrast -the difference between the average change of the withingroup correlations and the average change of the cross-group correlations -is 0.28 (HAC standard error = 0.10) and is statistically significant at the 1% level. A major source of this change is the decline in the correlation between UK GDP growth and that of France and Germany, and an increase in its correlation with the North American economies. The emergence of the two regional groups, Englishspeaking and Euro-zone, also is evident in Figure 6 through the increasing FrenchGerman and Italian-German correlations and the increasing correlation between the UK and the US (and their decreasing correlations with Germany).
International Synchronization
Third, the synchronization of Japanese cycles with the rest of the G7 has been low throughout this 40-year period and recently decreased further. The average correlation between four-quarter GDP growth in Japan and that in the remaining G7 countries fell from 0.36 during 1960-1983 to 0.18 during 1984-2002. Although this decline of 0.18 is estimated imprecisely (HAC standard error = 0.17), it is large in economic terms and is consistent with the rolling correlations in Figure 6 and with other VAR-based evidence presented below that fluctuations in the Japanese economy became detached from those in the other G7 economies during the 1990s.
The Factor-Structural VAR model
There are several frameworks available for developing a time series model with enough structure to permit answering the questions of interest here, such as the fraction of a country's cyclical variance that is due to international shocks and how that has changed over time. Before discussing the specific framework used in this paper, a factor structural VAR, it is useful to discuss the competing modeling options and to assess their strengths and weaknesses.
The basic issue to be resolved is the best way to identify a world (or G7) shock. One approach is simply to define a world shock to be the innovation in a univariate time series model of world (or G7) GDP growth. While this approach has the advantage of being easy to implement, because US output receives great weight in G7 GDP it confounds world shocks with US shocks and idiosyncratic shocks to other large economies. Suppose there were in fact no common shocks and no trade; this identification scheme would nevertheless attribute a large fraction of US fluctuations to a common shock as an arithmetic implication of its construction. also adopt this strategy, using a weighting scheme rather than principal components to extract the innovation in a single common G7 factor. In principle the principal components/nonparametric approach has the advantages of the second approach without the disadvantage of assuming that all comovements stem from the common disturbance rather than through trade spillovers; in practice, however, if this approach is implemented using only G7 data then individual countries are necessarily heavily weighted leading to the same problems as the first approach, in particular finding a common factor even if there is none.
A fourth approach, the one used here, is to adopt a VAR framework for the lagged effects but to identify world shocks as those that affect all countries within the same period. Thus country-specific shocks can lead to spillovers, but those spillovers are assumed to happen with at least a one-quarter lag. This results in By defining international shocks to be the common components of the innovations in the seven-country VAR, the FSVAR identification scheme has several desirable features. In a world in which all shocks are country-specific and international transmission takes at least one quarter, no common shocks would be identified and this scheme would correctly conclude that there are no international shocks. This would be true even if lagged trade effects produce dynamic international comovements. Moreover, the lagged spillover effects of a countryspecific shock would be correctly captured by the VAR dynamics. For example, monetary policy shocks are often modeled as having real effects after no shorter a lag than one quarter (e.g., Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 1999), so under this standard identification assumption a surprise monetary contraction in the US that subsequently affects Canadian economic activity would be identified correctly by the FSVAR as an country-specific shock followed by a spillover, not as a common shock. The definition of what constitutes a common shock, however, does depend on the frequency of the data. For example, a financial crisis that starts in one country but spills over into other G7 financial markets within days would be identified in our quarterly FSVAR as a global shock (if it had real effects). Also, an international shock that affects one country first and the others after only a lag of a quarter or more would be misclassified by the FSVAR as an idiosyncratic shock, transmitted via spillovers.
We consider the FSVAR model consisting of the VAR model (3) in which the errors have the factor structure vt = Tft +£,, where E{ftfl) = diagOr/j , . . . , afk) and £(&£/) = diag(o^ , . . . , ahx ),
where ft are the common international factors, T is the 7 x k matrix of factor loadings, and %t are the country-specific, or idiosyncratic, shocks. In (5), the common international shocks (the common factors) are identified as those shocks that affect output in multiple countries contemporaneously. We estimate the FSVAR using Gaussian maximum likelihood. The FSVAR specification (5) is overidentified, so empirical evidence can be brought to bear on the number of factors k. Likelihood ratio tests of the overidentifying restrictions are summarized in Table 6 . In both subsamples and in the pooled full sample, the hypothesis of k = 1 is rejected against the unrestricted alternative (that is, against Y<v having full rank) at the 1% significance level, but the null hypothesis of k = 2 is not rejected at the 10% significance level. These results suggest that k = 2 is appropriate, so we adopt a specification with two common international shocks.
Empirical Results
This section presents empirical results based on the two-factor FSVAR, including an analysis of the sensitivity of the results to some modeling decisions.
Changing Importance of Common and Country-Specific Shocks
The factor structure permits a decomposition of the ft-step ahead forecast error for GDP growth in a given country into three sources: unforeseen common shocks, unforeseen domestic shocks, and spillover effects of unforeseen domestic shocks to other G7 countries. Because the country shocks and the common shocks are all uncorrelated by assumption, this decomposition in turn permits a threefold decomposition of the variances of the /z-step-ahead forecast error and other filtered versions of GDP. Table 7 summarizes these variance decompositions for GDP growth and for BP-filtered GDP. At the one-quarter horizon, international spillovers account for none of the GDP growth forecast error variance: this is the assumption used to identify the international shock. At longer horizons, spillovers typically account for between 5% and 15% of the variance of GDP growth, depending on the country and the subsample. Most of the variance of GDP growth is attributed to the common and idiosyncratic domestic shocks, but their relative importance varies considerably across countries. In the first period, the effects of international shocks at the four-quarter horizon are estimated to be the greatest for Canada, France, and Germany, and the least for Italy and Japan. In the second period, almost all the forecast error variance in Japan is attributed to domestic shocks, a result consistent with the declining correlation between GDP in Japan and in other countries in the second period reported in Section 4.
The relative importance of international sources of fluctuations, either common shocks or spillovers, can be measured as one minus the share of the forecast error variance attributed to domestic shocks; a small domestic share corresponds to a relatively larger role for international rather than domestic disturbances. Only Japan and Germany show a marked increase in the fraction of the variance attributed to domestic shocks, while Canada, Italy, and the US show a marked decrease. The variance decompositions for BP-filtered GDP yield similar conclusions to the variance decompositions of GDP growth at the four-and eightquarter-ahead horizon. Figure 7 are those of the variance; the lower line is the contribution to the variance of the international shocks, the middle line is the sum of the contributions of the international shocks and spillovers, and the top line is total variance, so the gap between the top and middle lines is the contribution to the variance of domestic shocks. For Germany, the UK, and the US, the recent decline in the overall volatility tracks a decline in the variance arising from international shocks. For Italy, the large historical decline in the variance is associated with a declining importance of domestic shocks. For Japan, international shocks have become unimportant, and domestic shocks explain nearly all of its volatility in the 1990s and are the source of its recent increase in volatility.
Figure 7 presents time-varying estimates of the variance decomposition of BP-filtered GDP, based on rolling estimates of the two-factor FSVAR (as before, using exponential weighting). The units in
The correlations presented in Section 4 suggest the emergence of a Eurozone cluster in the second period. This raises the question of whether one of the factors in the second period might be interpreted as a "Euro-zone only" factor. The hypothesis that one of the common factors loads only on France, Germany, and Italy provides three testable restrictions on the FSVAR. In the FSVAR estimated over 1960-1983, this restriction is rejected at the 5% significance level (p = 0.02), but when estimated over 1984-2001, the restriction is not rejected at the 10% significance level (p = 0.31). Thus, the hypothesis that one of the two factors corresponds to a continental Europe factor can be rejected in the first period but not in the second, providing a precise interpretation of the apparent emergence of the Euro-zone cluster.
Changes in Volatility: Impulse or Propagation?
In principle, the contribution of international shocks to output volatility could decrease because the variance of the international shocks has decreased, because a shock of a fixed magnitude has less of an effect on the economy, or both. Said differently, the variance of GDP growth in a given country can change because the magnitude of the shocks impinging on that economy have changed or because the effects of those shocks have changed.
In this section, we decompose the change in the variance from the first subsample to the second into changes in the magnitudes of the shocks ("impulses") and changes in their effect on the economy ("propagation"). 
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That is, the change in the variance can be decomposed into the contribution from the change in the shock variance plus the contribution from the change in the impulse response. The decomposition (6) is additive so these contributions can be aggregated into variance changes arising from the common shocks, spillovers, and own shocks, with each type of shock in turn decomposed into changes in variances arising from changing shock variances and from changing impulse responses; this yields a six-way decomposition of the change in the variance of GDP forecast errors from the first period to the second. This decomposition (and the counterfactual calculations in the next subsection) requires that the covariance matrix of the factors, £//, and the factor loadings, F, are separately identified. We identify the factors by assuming that they are uncorrelated (so that Eyy is diagonal) and that the second factor has no impact effect on the US (so that Vus,2 = 0). These restrictions yield factors with a plausibly stable interpretation across the two subsamples. The dramatic changes in Europe suggest that other identifying assumptions, such as France, 2 = 0, are unlikely to yield factors with the same interpretations across subsamples. The scale of the factors is identified by the restriction that each column of F has unit length, that is I^F/ = 1 for / = 1,2. We investigate alternative assumptions in Section 6.5. Table 8 presents this six-way decomposition of the change in variances of four quarter-ahead forecast errors in GDP. Standard errors, computed using parametric bootstrap simulations, are shown in parentheses. Evidently, the decline in the variance between the two periods is to a great extent attributed to a decline in the magnitudes of the shocks. For all countries except Japan changes in the variance of shocks led to a large and statistically significant decline in volatility. Indeed, for Canada, France, the UK, and the US, the decline in the shock variances more than accounts for the drop in the variance of GDP forecast errors, in the sense that changes in the propagation mechanism worked to increase rather than to decrease the total variance across these two periods (although this increase is statistically significant only for Canada). For Germany and Italy, the net contribution of changes in propagation is small, so that most of the variance reductions in Germany and Italy are attributed to changes in the magnitudes of the shocks. The exception here, as we have seen in other aspects of this analysis, is Japan, in which the decline in the variance is largely attributed to changes in the propagation mechanism, not to changes in the size of shocks. Among the different types of shocks, reductions in the size of country-specific shocks is important in all countries except France and Japan. A reduction in the size of international shocks played a substantial role in the volatility moderation in Canada, France, Germany, and the US. In addition, in all countries a small, typically statistically insignificant portion of the moderation is attributed to smaller foreign idiosyncratic shocks. Table 8 is that there have been important changes in the effect of an international shock of a fixed magnitude on some of these economies. This changing effect is examined further in Figure 8 , which presents the impulse response functions for the different countries in the two subsamples with respect to the first common factor (Figure 8a ) and the second common factor (Figure 8b) . For the first factor there is a large estimated increase in the magnitude of the effect of the common shocks and in its persistence for Canada, France, Italy, the UK, and the US. The second factor has become more important for France, Germany and Italy and generally less important for the other countries. Again, Japan is different than the rest of the G7, with the estimated responses to both shocks being nonzero in the first period but nearly zero in the second. This counterfactual question can be addressed by suitably combining the impulse responses from the second period FS VAR with the shock variances from the first-period FSVAR, then computing the implied moments. The resulting estimated variances are summarized in Table 9 . Comparing the first line of each panel (the estimated standard deviations based on second-period impulse response functions and second-period shock variances) with the second line (in which the first-period variance of the common shocks is used) reveals that all countries, except again Japan, would have had considerably greater volatility over the past two decades had the world experienced the first-period shocks. For example, the standard deviation of four-quarter GDP growth in the US would have been approximately 2.2 percentage points, compared with the actual value of 1.6 percentage points; the standard deviation of French four-quarter GDP growth, which in reality was essentially constant over the two periods, would have increased from 1.4 to 2.2 percentage points had the second period experienced international shocks of the same magnitude as the first period. The cross-country correlations implied by this counterfactual scenario are summarized in Table 10 . Under the counterfactual scenario the correlations typically increase by 0.10 (Japan again is the exception). According to these estimates, had the common shocks in the second period been as large as they were during the first period, international business cycles would have been more highly synchronized than they actually were, and indeed would have been more highly synchronized than there were in the 1960-1983 period.7
One lesson from

An Examination of the International Shocks
Because moderation of the international shocks appears to be an important source of the moderation in G7 volatility, it is of interest to see if these international shocks can be linked to observable and interpretable time series.
This section examines several candidates for such observable shocks, taken from Stock and Watson (2002a) . The first candidate is US monetary policy shocks; 7. The counterfactual exercises reported here assume that the VAR coefficients and idiosyncratic shock variances do not change when the factor variances change. In some models, such as the model of Heathcote and Perri (2004) , these parameters may change, raising Lucas critique caveats concerning these counterfactual calculations. the common international shocks are somewhat correlated with the US monetary policy shock and with the oil price measures, but not with the other shocks. Otherwise, however, the squared canonical correlations are nearly zero or are negative (possible because of the degrees of freedom adjustment), indicating that the common international shocks in the FSVAR are in these cases unrelated to these candidate observable shocks. Admittedly Table 1 1 represents a rather coarse attempt to identify the source of the international factors as several of the candidate shocks examined in Table 1 1 are US-centric, and an obvious next step is to examine alternative measures of global shocks.
Sensitivity Analysis
This section reports the results of two checks of the foregoing results to changes in the modeling assumptions or in the statistics reported.
Trade-Weighted VAR Lag Restrictions. As a check, we considered a further restriction of the VAR in which the coefficients on foreign GDP are proportional to trade shares. Elliott and Fatas ( 1 996) used a similar restriction to identify shocks in a structural VAR, and Norrbin and Schlagenhauf (1996) used it (as we do here) to simplify the lag dynamics. Accordingly, the restricted reduced form VAR is
where ( Table 9 , except they are based on the FSVAR (7) with trade-weight lag restrictions.
In the restricted reduced form VAR (7), the number of coefficients per equation equals the number of own lags (the degree of b(L)) plus the number of lags on trade-weighted foreign GDP (the degree of d(L)). AIC and BIC comparisons point to four own lags and one lag of trade-weighted foreign GDP growth. The FSVAR corresponding to (7) imposes the factor structure (5) on the reduced form errors in (7), and the model is estimated by Gaussian maximum likelihood.
As a gauge of the sensitivity of the results in the previous sections, we recomputed the counterfactual variances and correlations of Tables 9 and 10 for the numerical values for the estimated changes in variances in Tables 9(a) and 12 differ, the qualitative conclusions are the same. In most countries, the variances of four-quarter GDP growth would have been considerably larger had secondperiod shocks been as large as first-period shocks. The main differences between the standard deviations in Tables 9(a) and 12 is the estimated increase for the UK, which is less using the trade-weighted FS VAR than the base case FS VAR in Table 9 (a). The main differences between the implied correlations in Tables 10  and 13 is that the model-based estimates in Table 13 (a) (estimates of actuals, not counterfactuals) in some cases differ considerably from the actual sample correlations in Table 5 (a). The trade-weighted model especially fails to capture the correlations involving Canada. In this sense, the trade-weighted FS VAR does not fit the data as well as the FSVAR(4,1). Still, the main conclusion from Table 10 that international synchronization would have been substantially greater had the common shocks in the second period been as large as they were in the first -also obtains using the trade-weighted FSVAR.
Measuring Synchronization by Average Coherences. The analysis of international synchronization so far has relied on contemporaneous cross-correlations of four-quarter GDP growth and of BP-filtered GDP as the measures of comovements, but this can mask lagged associations. An alternative measure of comovements, which is invariant to these lagged effects, is the average coherence at business cycle frequencies. Specifically, let coo and co\ be the lower and upper frequencies that define the business cycle portion of the spectrum, and let sy • (co) be the cross-spectrum between the four quarter growth rates in countries / and j as in (4). One measure of the average coherence between four-quarter growth rates in countries / and j at business cycle frequencies is, r(D\ II (4) , \ || r Rfj (co0, 0)1 ) = -2 ^ m .
(C I44)(-)I2^) (C «^(-)||2^)
This measure reduces to the usual definition of the coherence when it is evaluated at a single frequency rather than over the range coo to co\. The square root of average coherence (8), R[j (cdo,co\), was computed for the counterfactual correlations examined in Table 10 , and the results are summarized in Table 14 (because the coherence has the interpretation of an R2, using the square root of the average coherence makes this measure more directly comparable to the correlations of Table 10 ). Comparing panel (a) of Tables 10 and 14 shows that the coherences are higher than the correlations of four-quarter growth rates, which is not surprising because the coherences are not sensitive to phase shifts and also focus on business cycle frequencies, whereas the four-quarter growth rates contain some higher frequency noise. The qualitative conclusions from the (8), computed using the FSVAR described in Section 4. The factual (panel (a)) and counterfactual (panel (b)) scenarios are the same as in Table 10. counterfactual exercise, however, are the same as those drawn from Table 10: under the counterfactual scenario, average business cycle coherences increase by an average of 0.07. In general, findings based on the contemporaneous correlations and the average coherence will be different. As it happens, however, the crosscountry lead-lag relations evidently are modest, so these different measures give similar results.
Alternative Assumptions for Identifying the Factors. The model used for the counterfactual exercises reported above identifies the scale of the factors by assuming that the columns of F had unit length. Table 15 reports results for two alternative assumptions. In the first alternative, factor 1 has a unit impact on the US and factor 2 has a unit impact on France. In the second alternative, factor 1 has an average unit impact on English-speaking countries, and factor 2 has an average unit impact on Euro-zone countries. Table 15 summarizes the changes in the standard deviation of four-quarter growth rates (as in Table 9 (a)) averaged across all of the series, and in average changes in correlations associated the common shock variance (that is, the difference in the elements Table 10(b) and  Table 10 
Discussion and Conclusion
These empirical results suggest four broad conclusions. First, although there has not been a general increase in international synchronization among G7 business cycles, there appear to have been important changes, in particular the emergence of two groups, one consisting of Euro-zone countries and the other of Englishspeaking countries, within which correlations have increased and across which correlations have decreased. Over this period, cyclical movements in the UK became less correlated with Euro-zone countries and more correlated with North American countries. Although the estimated magnitudes of the changes in these correlations are large from a macroeconomic perspective, the individual countrypair correlations and their changes are imprecisely estimated. Second, common international shocks have been smaller in the 1980s and 1990s than they were in the 1960s and 1970s. According to the FSVAR, this declining volatility of common G7 shocks is the source of much of the observed moderation in individual country business cycles. Moreover, this moderation of common G7 shocks is responsible, in a mechanical sense, for the failure of business cycles to become more synchronous as one might expect given the large increase in trade over this period: had world shocks been as large in the 1980s and 1990s as they were in the 1960s and 1970s, international cyclical correlations would have increased.
Third, the Japanese experience is in many ways exceptional. For the other G7 countries, volatility generally decreased or at least stayed constant in the 1990s, but it increased in the 1990s in Japan. During the 1980s and 1990s, cyclical fluctuations in Japanese GDP became almost detached from the other G7 economies, with domestic shocks explaining almost all of the cyclical movements in Japanese GDP. This finding is consistent with Asian trade being increasingly important for the Japanese economy and with the domestic nature of the economic difficulties Japan experienced in the 1990s.
Fourth, a robust finding is that, however measured, persistence of disturbances -both reduced-form innovations and structural shocks -has increased in Canada, France, the UK. In those countries, a shock of a given magnitude would result in more cyclical volatility today than 30 years ago.
This analysis has focused on documenting the changes in the magnitudes of shocks and their effects. An important next step is sorting out the reasons for these changes and their implications for economic policy.
